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No Exception to the Rule:
The Unconstitutionality of State Immigration Enforcement Laws
Pratheepan Gulasekaram*
Much scholarly and judicial ink has recently been spilled analyzing and determining the
fate of several state and local laws that purport to control immigration, or at least critical aspects
of immigrants’ lives.1 The Supreme Court has adjudicated disputes between federal and subfederal entities in this arena for almost 150 years, siding overwhelmingly with the federal
government and striking down state and local laws. Despite this historical and doctrinal
background, in the last decade, jurisdictions from across the country have renewed these debates
with particular vigor, once again enacting laws that impact the lives of non-citizens, especially
undocumented ones.2 Such laws run a wide gamut, involving state and local officers in
immigration enforcement, penalizing businesses for the hiring of unauthorized workers,
requiring non-citizens to carry proof of lawful status, sanctioning landlords for renting to
undocumented persons, demanding documentation for voting, and preventing localities from
enacting sanctuary-type provisions.3 Predictably, these ordinances have galvanized bitterly
contested court battles to determine their constitutionality.4 Scholarly commentary, litigation,
and judicial evaluation of these laws have focused primarily on the propriety of state and local
involvement in the ostensibly federal realm of immigration regulation.
The state of Arizona has made itself ground zero for such battles, attempting repeatedly
through legislation to vindicate states’ ability to participate in immigration regulation. Arizona’s
elected officials have garnered significant national attention with passage of the Legal Arizona
Workers Act (LAWA),5 upheld in the Supreme Court’s recent Chamber of Commerce of the
United States v. Whiting opinion,6 and SB 1070,7 the notorious state immigration enforcement
* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law (JD, Stanford Law School). Thank you to
Professors Stephen Lee, Hiroshi Motomura, Juliet Stumpf, and Jonathan Todres for their comments and suggestions
on this Issue Brief. Thank you to the American Constitutional Society for their invitation to share my thoughts on
this topic.
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See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (enjoining city’s anti-illegal immigrant
ordinance), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted and judgment vacated by No.
10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011); Gabriel Chin, et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona
Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47 (2010); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Villazor, Sanctuary Ordinances
& Immigration Federalism: A Dialectical Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1661 (2010); Juliet P. Stumpf, States of
Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557 (2008); Michael Wishnie,
State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 (2004).
2
See generally Migration Policy Institute, National Center on Immigrant Integration Policy, State and Local
Immigration Regulation, available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/integration/regulation.cfm.
3
See generally National Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Related to Immigration and Immigrants,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19897; National Conference of State Legislatures, Chart of
2011 Enacted Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in States, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabId=23362.
4
See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (upholding the Legal
Arizona Worker’s Act); United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011) (striking down Arizona’s SB 1070);
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2010) cert. granted and judgment vacated by No. 10-772, 2011
WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011).
5
Legal Arizona Workers Act of 2007, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211, 212, 212.01 (2010).
6
131 S.Ct. 1968 (2011).
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law, much of it enjoined by the Ninth Circuit in its U.S. v. Arizona opinion.8 Arizona has
recently asked for Supreme Court review, and many predict the case will make its way to the
high court in the near future.
In this resurgent contest over sub-federal participation in immigration policy and
enforcement, the state of Arizona won the most recent battle with Whiting. There, the Court
upheld LAWA, which mandates that businesses in the state use the federal E-Verify system to
check the legal status of their employees, and then penalizes employers who continue to hire
unauthorized workers by revoking their licenses to do business. Based on this decision, some
believe that the Court is poised to re-align federal-state immigration responsibilities, and argue
that Whiting portends a new era in which states may freely engage in immigration enforcement.9
That proposition, and the limits of sub-federal immigration regulation, will be tested if
the Court decides to grant certiorari in Arizona. SB 1070, inter alia, provides state criminal
penalties for violations of federal immigration law, requires non-citizens to carry proof of lawful
status, and grants state law enforcement officers the latitude to discover immigration violations
and enforce immigration law. Importantly, Arizona has made clear its regulatory purpose in
enacting SB 1070:
“The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make
attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and
local government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act
are intended to work together to discourage and deter the unlawful
entry and presence of aliens and economic activity by persons
unlawfully present in the United States.”10
In doing so, Arizona boldly declares that it intends to participate in the reduction of unlawfully
present persons and thus, announces its entry into the core of immigration enforcement and
policy.
This Issue Brief concludes that while Whiting may be a welcome sign for sub-federal
entities desirous of using legal sanctions to discourage local businesses from hiring unauthorized
workers, it does not otherwise alter the division of power between the nation and states vis-à-vis
immigration policy. Fundamentally, Whiting sheds little light on the Court’s potential decision
in Arizona. While states may carve out limited regulatory power in the business-licensing area,
the larger and more important field of immigration enforcement and policy should remain the
sole province of the federal government. Undoubtedly, viewed at the highest level of generality,
LAWA and SB 1070 are both state laws intended to discover and disincentivize the presence of
undocumented immigrants. However, state business licensing penalties that punish employers
7

Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070, amended by H.B. 2162 (Ariz. 2010).
641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).
9
See, e.g., Kris Kobach, Law and Border, NATIONAL REVIEW, July 4, 2011, available at
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/271090/law-and-border-kris-w-kobach?page=1; John C. Eastman & Karen
J. Lugo, Arizona’s Immigration Storm, 12 Engage 68 (2011), available at http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20110603_EastmanLugoEngage12.1.pdf; Ilya Shapiro, S.B. 1070: Constitutional but Bad Policy,
CATO INSTITUTE, July 13, 2011, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13354.
10
S.B. 1070 § 1.
8
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are necessarily different than state criminal immigration laws that punish undocumented
immigrants and seek to achieve “attrition through enforcement.” Indeed, even apart from the
putative objects of enforcement of the respective laws, several factors differentiate SB 1070 from
LAWA, including historical background, the nature of the legal claims and analysis, the identity
of the plaintiffs, the nature of regulations, and the ramifications of the decisions in other
constitutional areas. As such, anti-immigrant and restrictionist forces will celebrate a pyrrhic
victory with Whiting, but may be disheartened by the final outcome in Arizona.
To be clear, this is a discussion relevant to more than an isolated, outlier state or city.
Arizona is not alone. Inspired by SB 1070, Alabama passed, and is currently defending in court,
an even more punitive state immigration enforcement law.11 So, too, have Georgia and other
states.12 In addition, the consequences of Whiting and Arizona, will determine the viability of
several current and nascent sub-federal enactments currently in litigation. Already, in the wake
of Whiting, the Court vacated and remanded Lozano v. Hazleton,13 in which plaintiffs challenged
the city of Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s ordinance penalizing rental of property to undocumented
persons and regulating businesses that hire unauthorized workers.14 By clarifying the
responsibility for immigration and immigrant control between federal and non-federal entities,
these cases will affect broad swaths of our national population, including the nearly 40 million
non-citizens and the estimated 11-12 million undocumented persons residing in our midst.15 The
sooner the Supreme Court curbs over-enthusiastic state assertions of immigration enforcement
authority, the sooner state and local governments, police, and public education and social
systems can regain the trust of, and continue serving, all state residents and communities,
including the 4 million U.S.-citizen children of undocumented parents.16
Part I of this Issue Brief examines the Court’s methodology and reasoning in the
business-licensing case, concluding Whiting’s preemption framework cannot justify broader state
immigration enforcement schemes. While federal law expressly contemplates and permits
certain state licensing sanctions, in contrast, enforcement schemes like SB 1070 do not fall into
any recognized exceptions in federal law, run afoul of federal policy, and incite violations of
other important constitutional provisions. Part II considers more wide-ranging immigration
federalism concerns occasioned by sub-federal enactments like LAWA and SB 1070. Again,
here, this paper concludes that the nature of interaction between federal and sub-federal
sovereigns militates against state power to criminalize unlawful presence and enforce
immigration policy, other than through federally approved, cooperative agreements. Finally,
11

Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2011, Ala. Laws 535, et seq. (2011);
Richard Fausset, U.S. Sues over Alabama Immigration Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2011, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/02/nation/la-na-alabama-immigration-20110802.
12
GA. CODE §§ 16-5-46, 17-5-100 (2011); S.C. CODE §§ 16-9-460, 23-6-60 (2011); MISS. CODE §71-11-3(c)(i)
(2011).
13
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 (M.D. Pa. 2007), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 620 F.3d 170
(3d Cir. 2010), cert. granted and judgment vacated by No. 10-772, 2011 WL 2175213 (U.S. June 6, 2011).
14
Julia Preston, Judge Voids Ordinance on Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/us/27hazelton.html; Associated Press, Pennsylvania Town Enacts Strict Illegal
Immigration Ordinance, FOX NEWS, July 14, 2006.
15
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR. UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION: NATIONAL
AND STATE TRENDS 2010 (2011), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/133.pdf.
16
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW HISPANIC CTR. A PORTRAIT OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES iii, Fig. 4 (2009), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/107.pdf.
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Part III explores the meaning and significance of this recent spate of sub-federal activity, arguing
that while SB 1070 and its ilk will not withstand judicial scrutiny, they nevertheless sound a
useful warning and provide a blueprint for federal immigration reform.
I.

Distinguishing Employer Sanctions Laws from Broader Immigration Enforcement
Schemes

Courts tasked with evaluating sub-federal policies that purport to control immigration, or
some aspect of immigrants’ lives, generally focus on structural power analysis – that is, the
allocation of regulatory power between federal and sub-federal sovereignties. A long line of
cases, starting from Chy Lung v. Freeman,17 to Hines v. Davidowitz,18 Graham v. Richardson,19
De Canas v. Bica,20 and finally to contemporary cases like Whiting, showcase this basic
framework. Although some of these cases measure state law against constitutional norms and
structure,21 courts are generally wont to avoid constitutional pronouncements unless necessary.22
In the immigration context, the Supreme Court’s avoidance of constitutional rulings in favor of
statutory decisions generally results in more favorable outcomes for immigrants.23
Grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution,24 the immigration
preemption framework operates from granular, textual comparison between particular state and
federal statutes to more nebulous assessments of state schemes against constitutional structure.
Congress may expressly preempt sub-federal enactments by legislating its preemptive intent into
a federal statute. Even if Congress has not legislated its preemptive intent, sub-federal laws may
still be invalidated if the Court finds that it is impossible to comply with both federal and subfederal law at the same time, or when sub-federal law is an obstacle to accomplishing the full
purpose and objectives of federal law. More generally, if the Court finds that the Congress
intended to occupy the entire regulatory field, state laws in that field are also preempted.
Beyond these preemption methodologies which focus on textual analysis and the
interplay between federal and sub-federal enactments, in the immigration arena, courts will
sometimes apply “constitutional” preemption analysis, under which they will strike down a state

17

92 U.S. 275 (1875) (striking down California law regulating immigration from China, stating that the federal
government has the exclusive power to regulate immigration).
18
312 U.S. 52 (1941) (striking down Pennsylvania alien registration scheme).
19
403 U.S. 365 (1971) (striking down Arizona law denying noncitizens’ eligibility for public assistance).
20
424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding, prior to passage of IRCA, California’s employer-sanctions law for hiring of
unauthorized workers).
21
See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 367-69 (9th Cir. 2011) (Noonan, J., concurring) (arguing that
SB 1070 interferes with national foreign policy prerogatives, and is therefore unconstitutional on that basis).
22
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Building, 408 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (discussing doctrine of
constitutional avoidance and stating “[if] an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”); cf. Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct.
1068 (2011) (focusing solely on narrow, statutory preemption analysis).
23
Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law after a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 548-49, 565 (noting that subconstitutional rulings have been more
favorable to immigrants).
24
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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or local ordinance that attempts to regulate “pure immigration law.”25 Constitutional
preemption, which can be found even in the absence of enacted federal law, occurs when subfederal laws attempt to govern entry and exit of noncitizens, and the conditions under which they
remain in the country.26 It is based in the federal government’s plenary power over immigration
and the federal power to conduct foreign affairs.27
Part I.A explains how the Court employed the express preemption methodology in
Whiting to uphold the state business-licensing law. Despite that favorable result for states, Part
I.B will show that Whiting’s reasoning and methodology actually portend the invalidation of SB
1070 and other state immigration enforcement schemes. Finally, Part, I.C discusses other
constitutional defects with SB 1070.
A.

Express Preemption and State Regulation of Business-Licensing: The Limitations
of Whiting

In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has consistently struck down sub-federal
lawmaking using preemption analysis. Rarely, sub-federal enactments have survived, but only
when the state or locality has regulated in an area of traditional state concern, and when the
federal government had not disapproved of state action. The most relevant example is De Canas
v. Bica, in which the Court upheld a 1971 California law that imposed fines on in-state
employers who knowingly employed unlawfully present persons if such hiring adversely
affected lawfully present workers.28 In preserving California’s employer sanctions law, the
Court in De Canas noted that while the “power to regulate immigration is unquestionably…a
federal power,” states nevertheless retain broad police powers over the employment relationships
of workers within the state.29
De Canas would seem to make LAWA an easy case, but for the fact that Congress can
respond to state enactments like the California employer sanctions law upheld in De Canas
(assuming Congress acts within its Article I powers). Indeed, in 1986, Congress exercised those
powers by enacting the Immigration Control and Reform Act (IRCA) expressly to preempt state
laws that sanction employers for the hiring of unauthorized persons.30 Taking direct aim at laws
like California’s unauthorized worker law, IRCA explicitly prohibited sub-federal entities from
enacting “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through
licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ…unauthorized aliens.”31 This provision, a
by-product of one of Congress’ prior attempts to pass comprehensive federal immigration
reform, provides Arizona with a plausible and specific defense for LAWA, as Congress appears
25

See Stumpf, supra note 1, at 1600-01.
Hines, 312 U.S. at 56-60; see also Toll v. Moreno, 45 U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (striking down Maryland’s law denying
certain nonimmigrant state residents in-state tuition rates, and stating “Our cases have long recognized the
preeminent role of the Federal Government with respect to the regulation of aliens within our borders.”).
27
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Cases), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (determining that Congress’
power to exclude aliens was immune from searching judicial inquiry, and was grounded in the federal government’s
power to conduct foreign affairs); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 40-44 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
28
De Canas, 424 U.S. 351 (1976).
29
Id. at 354-56.
30
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2006).
31
Id. § 1324a(h)(2).
26
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to have gone out of its way to note that state licensing penalties were to be treated differently
than direct employer sanctions.
Read together then, De Canas and IRCA stand for the proposition that state regulation of
employment relationships between state employers and unlawfully present persons is
permissible, if the federal government has not otherwise prohibited it.32 Thus, the question left
for the Court in Whiting was an exceedingly narrow one: Did LAWA count as a “licensing” law
within the exception written into IRCA? It is a question that the Court answered with in-depth
textual analysis and interpretation, focusing primarily on the meaning of “licensing or similar
law.”33 In fact, the five-member majority took pains to distinguish state licensing laws in the
employment field from all other manner of state regulation that could affect immigrants.34
This analytic methodology, itself, is the primary indication of the limited utility of
Whiting to states’ arguments in cases involving other types of state laws. The Court eschewed
broad pronouncements regarding the Constitution’s division of federal-state responsibility in the
area of immigration in favor of a detailed comparison of LAWA’s text to the text of IRCA and
the federal Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). This
methodological point is important because it limits Whiting’s reach to the specific context of
business licensing-type laws that sanction employers for hiring unauthorized workers. While
LAWA achieves the same result as the pre-IRCA California employer sanctions law, IRCA’s
text and its licensing exception at least provide a colorable basis upon which to uphold LAWA.
Importantly, the Court’s reasoning requires that, if Congress were to amend IRCA to erase the
licensing exception, LAWA would also be plainly unconstitutional. Further, absent the licensing
exemption, any state attempt to make the federal E-Verify mandatory would also be preempted,
as the Court would have no basis to believe the federal government authorized states to legislate
in the immigration-employment arena.
B.

Inapplicability of Whiting to SB 1070 and Judicial Analysis of State Enforcement
Schemes

Despite upholding state business-licensing policies that target employers of unauthorized
workers, the Court will most likely strike down state immigration enforcement schemes like SB
1070. Unlike Arizona’s plausible argument for LAWA, the state’s entire legal defense of its
unilateral decision to criminalize unlawful presence and participate in immigration enforcement
rests dubiously on a few disparate Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provisions that
32

Note that this should not be read as an endorsement of either expanded federal use of E-Verify as some have
proposed, or approval of state business-licensing schemes like LAWA. Despite Whiting, federal and state use of EVerify will still lead to risk of erroneous prosecution. 131 S.Ct. at 1991 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Further,
serious concerns remain about the expansion of E-Verify into the employment space, as a matter of sound policy.
See How Expanding E-Verify Would Hurt American Workers and Business, (Immig. Pol’y Center), Mar. 2, 2010,
available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Everify_030210.pdf.
33
See Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1978-79, 1987-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reasoning that LAWA cannot be fairly
termed a “licensing or similar law”, and is therefore preempted by IRCA).
34
Id. at 1981, 1983 (“IRCA expressly preempts some state powers dealing with the employment of unauthorized
aliens and it expressly preserves others…. [LAWA] falls within … the confines of the authority Congress chose to
leave to the States….” The majority also noted that the several cases in which state laws were preempted involved
“uniquely federal areas of regulation”).
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recognize a narrow and well-defined role for states in enforcement matters. No provision in the
federal scheme approximates the specificity and lucidity of IRCA’s carved-out exception for
licensing penalties that formed the sine qua non of the Court’s Whiting opinion. In addition, the
Court will strike down laws like SB 1070 because they intrude on the traditionally federal area of
immigration enforcement. Defining immigration violations and then enforcing them is a field
occupied by federal law, leaving room only for supervised, directed, and enumerated forms of
state involvement.
Arizona’s SB 1070 attempts to discourage and diminish the presence of undocumented
immigrants within the state by (1) requiring local law enforcement officers to determine the
immigration status of any detainee or arrestee they suspect is an unauthorized immigrant,35 (2)
levying state criminal penalties for failure to comply with federal alien registration laws or carry
a registration document,36 (3) providing state criminal penalties for unauthorized persons who
solicit or perform work,37 and (4) allowing warrantless arrest of persons based on probable cause
that the arrestee is removable from the U.S.38 None of the enjoined provisions of SB 1070 are
saved by any textual exception in the federal immigration law analogous to IRCA and its express
exemption for business licensing.
States like Arizona, that have enacted SB 1070-type ordinances essentially advance two
major arguments in defense of their laws to overcome preemption claims: (1) state immigration
laws mirror federal law and are therefore not preempted; and (2) federal immigration law
provides for state involvement in immigration enforcement, and therefore state immigration
enforcement schemes are not preempted.39 In addition, states may advance a theory of inherent
state power to enact and enforce immigration laws.40 This final catch-all theory of state
immigration power directly implicates constitutional, as opposed to primarily statutory,
questions, and will be addressed later in this Issue Brief.
As both the federal trial court in Arizona and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held,
neither of the states’ primary defenses survives analysis.41 First, the Supreme Court has already
held that state law can be preempted even when the state’s purpose echoes the goals of a federal
policy.42 Further, laws like SB 1070 do not mirror the mechanism and consequences of federal
law. SB 1070 attaches criminal penalties to conduct and action that federal law only treats as a

35

Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, S.B. 1070 § 2(B), amended by H.B. 2162 (Ariz.
2010).
36
Id. § 3.
37
Id. § 5(C).
38
Id. § 6.
39
See Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp.
2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB).
40
See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make
Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179 (2005); Eastman and Lugo, supra note 9, at 68 (“Arizona Has Sufficient
Inherent Police Power to Authorize Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law Alongside Federal Authorities.”).
41
See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010), affirmed by 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011).
42
See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (“The conflicts are not rendered irrelevant by
the State’s argument that there is no real conflict between the statutes because they share the same goals…. The fact
of a common end hardly neutralizes conflicting means….”) (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505
U.S. 88 (1992).
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civil violation.43 Noncitizens who are unlawfully present after having entered lawfully – a
category into which approximately 40% of the unlawfully present population falls – are
deportable through the civil removal process, but have not otherwise committed any federal
crime.44
In addition, as Whiting’s discussion of IRCA highlights, federal law punishes employers
who hire undocumented workers, but does not attach criminal penalties to unlawfully present
persons solely for seeking employment. Because LAWA mimicked this basic structure, it
survived preemption analysis; it also punished employers without penalizing the workers
themselves. Based on Whiting’s reasoning, if Arizona had included criminal penalties against
unauthorized workers as part of LAWA, the law would certainly have been declared
unconstitutional; it would not have mirrored federal law, and IRCA’s licensing exception would
not have provided safe harbor. SB 1070, in comparison, criminalizes exactly this behavior,
levying sanctions on unlawfully present persons for the state crime of seeking employment while
unauthorized to work. By definition then, SB 1070, with its criminal penalties, is not a facsimile
of federal law.
Even though laws like SB 1070 use federal immigration status as the touchstone for state
criminal consequences, and are ostensibly enacted to help ensure enforcement of federal
immigration law, such state policies still violate federal prerogatives. Decisions to use
congressionally-defined immigration status as the trigger for civil and criminal consequences are
left to the federal executive, not to individual states. As part of the executive’s Article II duties,
the President is tasked with “taking care” that federal laws are carried out.45 Using this authority,
the prosecutorial branch of the Department of Homeland Security routinely issues directives on
the priority order for arrest of unlawfully present persons, and the use of prosecutorial discretion
and deferral for some unlawfully present persons.46 As federal courts have held, this discretion
and its impact on on-the-ground enforcement is integral to defining the limits and meaning of

43

See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006) (delegating removability decisions to immigration judges, not federal courts);
Harisidades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (reaffirming that deportation is a civil procedure, not a criminal
one). SB 1070 makes it a state crime to be unlawfully present, subject to prosecution in a state court; in comparison,
the Immigration and Nationality Act generally treats unlawful presence as a civil transgression, subject to an
administrative procedure. See Margaret Stock, Arizona v. United States: The Tail Wagging the Dog on Regulating
Immigration Enforcement, SCOTUS BLOG, July 14, 2011, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/07/arizonav-united-states-the-tail-wagging-the-dog-on-regulating-immigration-enforcement/.
44
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006). The remaining unlawfully present persons are likely those who entered
without inspection. In addition to making one removable, unlawful entry can be charged as a federal misdemeanor
under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, although federal authorities routinely do not – either because of resource constraints or
exercises of discretion – prosecute it. See Ingrid Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 13291334 (2010).
45
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
46
Memorandum from John Morton, Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 3 (June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf; see also Memorandum from William J. Howard, Principal
Legal Advisor, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Prosecutorial Discretion (Oct. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.shusterman.com/pdf/prosecutorialdiscretionimmigration1005.pdf (setting out reasons, principles, and
guidelines for exercise of prosecutorial discretion by federal immigration prosecutors).
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federal enforcement law and policy.47 Thus, states’ adopting different schemes to achieve
ostensibly similar goals fails to mirror these nuances of federal policy, and further, usurps the
President’s power of execution.48
The state’s second major claim – that federal law already contemplates state involvement
in enforcement – also does not survive preemption inquiry. SB 1070 is a unilaterally-created,
federally-unsupervised state enforcement scheme that requires enforcement of all manner of
criminal and civil immigration law violations. Devastating to Arizona’s argument, federal law
envisions state cooperation in immigration enforcement only for certain criminal violations or
under direct supervision and express agreement with the federal government.
Federal law, in isolated and circumscribed instances, permits state involvement in
immigration enforcement. Section 287(g) of the INA authorizes the federal government to enter
into a “written agreement” with a state to allow qualified state officers to perform investigations
and detentions of non-citizens.49 Other sections of 8 U.S.C. §1357 permit, without written
agreement, voluntary communication of state officers with federal officials regarding the
immigration status of an individual and the cooperation of state officers with the federal
officials.50 Further, 8 U.S.C. §1252c authorizes state officials to arrest and detain individuals
who have illegally reentered the country after deportation, and §1324 allows state officers to
arrest those who might be smuggling, transporting, or harboring unlawful migrants.
While these isolated sections of the INA permit state involvement in immigration
enforcement, that permission is bound to particular circumstances.51 Under 287(g), general state
involvement in immigration law enforcement can occur only under written agreement with the
federal government and under conditions in which the federal officials have provided training to
local officers on immigration enforcement. Thus, the only state assistance contemplated by
287(g) is closely supervised, contractually agreed upon cooperation; not the freewheeling,
unilateral state enforcement envisioned by SB 1070. Sections 1252c and 1324 are limited to
defined conduct (illegal reentry and smuggling, respectively) and deal with criminal, not civil,
violations. Because Congress has already contemplated state participation in immigration
47
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enforcement and tolerance that constitutes federal immigration law.”).
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enforcement, but relegated such cooperation to specific crimes or under specific procedures, the
Court will most likely rule that Congress has occupied the field and SB 1070 is impliedly
preempted.
Indeed, to rule otherwise is to accept implausible and logically flawed premises. The
Court would have to read federal authorization for states to participate in certain instances, under
fixed conditions, as a general authorization for states to unilaterally participate in immigration
law enforcement under conditions determined by the state itself. Relatedly, it would have to
interpret the federal law’s isolated permissions for particular types of state involvement – and
exclusion of others – as somehow meaning that Congress really meant to include what it
excluded from the statute. In other words, the Court would have to, under the guise of
preemption analysis, wholly rewrite the INA and render several sections of federal immigration
law superfluous and toothless. Why list particular crimes and conditions of state cooperation if
the federal statute is to be read to authorize state enforcement under any circumstances for any
type of immigration violation? Congress need not have bothered to deliberate and legislate the
287(g) system of federally-supervised, written agreements between the federal and states
governments if it was actually authorizing unwritten, unwelcome, unsupervised, and untrained
state and local immigration enforcement. Statutory drafting and federal court interpretation of
that drafting simply doesn’t work the way Arizona needs it to, and for good reason.
Under this well-established interpretative framework, the state’s only recourse is to
persuade the Court of a highly dubious proposition: that states have inherent constitutional
authority to enforce all manner of federal immigration law, without agreement or permission
from the federal government. Such a reading drastically alters the long-standing constitutional
balance between the federal and state governments vis-à-vis immigration enforcement. The
Supreme Court has never endorsed a unilateral expansion of state law enforcement power into a
historically federal domain. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long been wary of state
intrusion into federal immigration law.52 In the end, to support this implausible claim, states are
forced to rely on one, non-binding, Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum from the George W.
Bush administration in 2002 supporting states’ claims of inherent authority to enforce
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immigration laws.53 But before that recent turn, the OLC had long-been convinced of the exact
opposite conclusion.54 More importantly, the legal reasoning used by Assistant Attorney General
Jay S. Bybee to reach his ahistorical and unprecedented 2002 opinion has been roundly criticized
as “mak[ing] little sense”55 and “misconstr[uing]” prior decisions.56 Thus, what might be
mistakenly interpreted as a two-sided debate, in truth, boils down to one aberrant view set
against a consistent narrative distrustful of state intrusion into immigration enforcement.57
Beyond this comparison between federal and sub-federal laws, the identity of the
respective plaintiffs and enforcement targets make the SB 1070 case easy to resolve against the
state of Arizona. Whereas Whiting was brought by private business interests represented by the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the plaintiff in U.S. v. Arizona is the federal government itself.
This fact is significant because the Supreme Court is likely to give more weight to the federal
government’s attempt to protect erosion of its own power than it is to a private party asserting
that the federal government’s supremacy was violated by state action.58 Indeed, while the U.S. is
jealously guarding its control over immigration enforcement in the SB 1070 case, the U.S.’s
briefing to the Court in Whiting, in contrast, explained that mandatory use of E-Verify would not
overburden the federal government’s data systems. In essence, the federal government in that
case disagreed with the contention that its prerogatives would be compromised by state action.
C.

Other Constitutional Flaws in State Immigration Enforcement Schemes

Of equal or greater concern than those bringing the respective suits, are those against
whom the laws will be enforced. Just like the federal policy effected by IRCA, businesslicensing laws strike at employers. IRCA and these state licensing laws reduce the incentive for
job-seeking migration by punishing businesses that hire unauthorized workers; importantly, they
do not punish the putative unauthorized employees themselves. This policy reflects the shared
moral and legal culpability for undocumented migration between business enterprises and the
migrants themselves. While migrants may make decisions to circumvent lawful entry
procedures, their ability to obtain employment in the United States is in the hands of employers
willing to hire them. The federal decision to focus workplace immigration enforcement on
employers, and not unauthorized workers, reflects the underlying notions that some citizens also
53
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bear responsibility for undocumented migration and that workers require protection regardless of
immigration status.
Enforcement schemes like SB 1070, in contrast, mobilize the might of state governments
directly against undocumented persons. This is more than simply a rhetorical or trivial
distinction. Indeed, state enforcement directly against undocumented persons for immigration
violations raises grave constitutional concerns of racial injustice and due process separate from
the preemption and structural power concerns.59 Supporters of SB 1070 implausibly argue that
racial profiling against Latinos and others who “look” foreign or undocumented will not occur
because the law expressly forbids law enforcement officers “to consider race, color, or national
origin in implementing the requirement of [the law] except to the extent permitted by the United
States or Arizona Constitution.” 60
First, it belies logic and human experience to believe that this statutory language will
prevent implicit use of race, color, and apparent national origin, when officers are tasked with
determining the legal status of an individual whom they have “reasonable suspicion” to believe is
unauthorized, or when they need “probable cause” to believe the individual has committed a
removable offense. Second, by allowing use of these constitutionally suspect factors “to the
extent” permitted by U.S. or Arizona law, the statute perversely endorses use of race, color, and
national origin by local police officers.61 In U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, a 1975 Supreme Court
decision regarding U.S. border enforcement actions near the U.S.-Mexico border, the Court
reasoned that “the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor.” 62 Not to be outdone, the Arizona
Supreme Court opined that while “Mexican ancestry” and “Hispanic appearance” alone may not
be sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion, those factors coupled with a “dress” or “hair
style” associated with Mexican identity could be.63 Further, under the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, officers may escape liability by proffering any objectively reasonable
basis for stopping and investigating an individual – even a pre-textual one that masks the
officers’ true motivations.64
Given this legal backdrop, the “prohibition” written into SB 1070 not only fails to
prevent racially disparate enforcement, it actually appears to encourage it.65 Even with SB 1070
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yet to go into effect, Arizona officials, including vocal proponent of rigorous enforcement,
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, have repeatedly been sued for violating the civil rights of immigrants.66
Empowering state and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration law and
new state immigration crimes will only exacerbate civil liberties concerns. Thus, aside from
preemption problems with state immigration enforcement schemes, the equality and due process
concerns alone are sufficient basis upon which the Court could and should declare them
unconstitutional.
*********
In sum, the Court’s decision to uphold LAWA against preemption claims does not predict
the same for SB 1070. While both clearly intend to discourage the presence of undocumented
immigrants, federal law contemplates the existence of state business-licensing laws through a
textual exception in federal immigration law itself. And, even with this express exception,
Whiting is neither a unanimous nor far-reaching opinion. At most, Whiting stands for the
proposition that state business-licensing laws that regulate employers will not reflexively be
struck down. Arizona’s SB 1070, in contrast, is not saved by a textual exception to the federal
regulatory scheme that defines civil and criminal immigration violations and prescribes the
circumstances for federal and state cooperation in enforcement of those laws. A state’s decision
to create its own immigration crimes and engage its law enforcement officers in civil and
criminal immigration regulation, untethered from federal oversight, violates basic notions of
federal supremacy and likely creates equal protection and due process concerns as well.
II.

Immigration Regulation: Federal v. State Domains

While the Court’s analysis will likely focus on the statutory preemption framework
discussed above, the recent increase in sub-federal immigration enactments – from employer
sanctions to rental ordinances to state immigration crimes – raises a more elemental question
about the respective roles of federal and sub-federal governments vis-à-vis immigrants and
immigration. Even as courts wrestle with the intricacies of statutory interpretation and
congressional intent to determine conflicts between federal and state laws in this area, courts
must also make judgments about the proper allocation of immigration power and the power over
immigrants.
Consider, for example, the business-licensing laws that target employers of unauthorized
workers. Both Whiting, and De Canas before it, rely on the notion that employer relationships
are traditionally the province of states, even if immigration control has traditionally been the
66
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province of the federal government. In essence, courts must make some determination – whether
explicitly or implicitly – regarding where they think any particular regulation falls on the
spectrum of traditional state sovereignty and control versus constitutionally-conferred federal
power. Focusing specifically on enforcement schemes like SB 1070, this federalism balance tips
in favor of the federal government.
As mentioned above, Arizona could prevail in the SB 1070 case if the Court were to rule
that states have inherent power to enforce immigration laws. To do so, however, effects lasting
and permanent change to the constitutional order. It would render the realm of immigration
federalism beyond the future reach of either Congress or state lawmakers, and deprive them of
the opportunity to engage in iterative legislating vis-à-vis immigration enforcement. In this
regard, the evolution from De Canas to IRCA to Whiting marks an on-going legislative
conversation between state and federal governments. Because the Court made a limited,
statutory ruling in Whiting, Congress could in the future, delete IRCA’s exemption and
invalidate LAWA. Alternatively, if Congress is not bothered by the result in Whiting, it could
choose to leave IRCA unmodified and allow states to continue enacting business-licensing laws.
In contrast, were the Court to hold that states have inherent authority in immigration
enforcement, it would leave the federal government no ability to set its immigration priorities
through policy debate and representative governance.
Undoubtedly, regulating for the public welfare and maintaining local policing are within
the traditional province of states.67 But, the creation of a state scheme of immigration crimes and
local enforcement of federal immigration laws are exactly the types of sub-federal policy the
Court has repeatedly struck down.68 This is because, at base, defining immigration crimes and
calibrating enforcement are things that the federal government – and only the federal government
– has historically done. Although some states had immigration laws in the early and middle
parts of the 19th Century,69 those existed before Congress began exercising its power of
naturalization and foreign commerce to establish federal legislation defining the qualifications,
conditions, and procedures for entry, residence, and expulsion from the country. Since the late
1800’s, the basics of immigration law – entry, exit, naturalization, and duration and conditions of
stay – have been under federal control. State participation, in areas such as business-licensing,
welfare provision, and supervised, cooperative enforcement, have all been at the pleasure and
discretion of the federal government, permitted by delegations and exceptions legislated into
federal policy.
When Arizona or any other state boldly announces that the intent of their policy is
“attrition through enforcement,” it unambiguously declares its intention to enter the core of
immigration law and policy. The Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, labeling SB
1070 the state’s “own immigration law enforcement policy.” Notably, this section of SB 1070
was not enjoined, as the District Court concluded that “[t]he Court cannot enjoin a purpose; the
67
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Arizona Legislature is free to express its viewpoint and intention as it wishes, and Section 1 has
no operative function.” While the statute’s purpose alone cannot define crimes or enforcement,
it clearly affects how law enforcement officers interpret the operative sections of the law. And,
because it expressly states Arizona’s desire to rid itself of the undocumented immigrant
population through enforcement – an exclusively federal function – it could indeed be sufficient
basis to declare the entirety of the statute unconstitutional under constitutional preemption
principles.
Aside from usurping core immigration policy functions, the other problem with state
immigration enforcement policies is their subversion of federal immigration priorities. Like
Arizona, the federal government is interested in discovering and apprehending unlawfully
present persons. However, given the scale of the issue, the complexity of immigration status and
removability determinations, economic realities, and resource limitations, the federal government
does not arrest and remove all unlawfully present persons.70 This is especially true as applied to
noncitizens who have not committed serious crimes or otherwise broken immigration laws. In
fact, as prioritized by the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), federal field
agents and prosecutors are to focus their attention on those undocumented persons who (1) are
national security risks, (2) are serious felons or have lengthy criminal records, (3) are known
gang members, and (4) have an egregious record of immigration violations.71 Arizona’s SB
1070, by requiring the discovery of legal status of stopped and detained individuals, those who
fail to carry an alien registration document, those who solicit work without authorization, and
those whom officers believe may have committed a removable offense, subverts the federal
government’s priority order. Indeed, Arizona’s law appears intentionally crafted to catch the
most easily discoverable and least culpable among unlawfully present persons, in the dogged
pursuit of “attrition” regardless of national public safety priorities.
Relatedly, state enforcement schemes necessitate substantial federal involvement. State
business-licensing sanctions are, for the most part, wholly contained state actions. State
authorities handle the investigation, prosecution, and punishment of LAWA violations. The
federal government’s involvement is limited to the state’s use of the federal E-Verify database to
check the lawful work status of the individual employee. The United States, writing amicus
curaie in Whiting, confirmed that such usage was consistent with its purpose in creating the
program, and that mandatory usage by all Arizona businesses would not overburden the
system.72 Further, once the federal database is accessed and issues a response, state prosecutors
and state courts are responsible for punishing the offending employer. The statute requires the
state to “notify” federal authorities, but the federal government need not take any action.
Arizona accomplishes its goals without further federal involvement.
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Enforcement schemes like SB 1070, however, are not self-contained and require
substantial federal resources to complete. Arizona’s goal of “attrition” – i.e., reduction in the
presence of unlawfully present persons – can only truly be realized by prosecution and removal
of those persons from the United States. Although individuals convicted under the various
provisions of SB 1070 must satisfy state criminal punishments, the state of Arizona cannot
remove them. Only the federal government can issue a Notice to Appear in front of an
immigration judge and an Order of Removal, and actually, physically remove an individual from
the country.73 State immigration arrest authority, even for federally-defined immigration crimes,
alters the dynamics, priorities, and resource-use of the federal civil removal system. SB 1070
compounds the existing problem of state arrests for federal criminal immigration violations by
funneling state arrests for federal civil immigration violations and state arrests for state criminal
immigration violations into the federal system. It thereby exponentially increases the burdens on
a federal enforcement and removal scheme of limited capacity.74 In stark contrast to Whiting,
where the federal government acquiesced in and encouraged Arizona’s use of federal resources,
in the SB 1070 context, the U.S. responded by filing suit against the state; doing so
unequivocally expresses the federal government’s disagreement with this form of resource
diversion by a state.
These problems with a state immigration enforcement scheme – its subversion of national
enforcement priorities, its inability to effect removal, its deterrence of non-citizen residence
within the state, and its necessitation of substantial federal involvement – contribute to a final
national problem: uniformity in immigration policy. When imagined as a subset of U.S. foreign
policy or as an expression of Congress’ uniform power over naturalization, immigration law, as a
constitutional matter, must be harmonized and unitary.75 By creating state criminal penalties
based on unlawful presence and activity in the United States, and embarking on a unilateral path
of attrition through enforcement, Arizona has essentially decided to part ways with the nation as
a whole, and other individual states who retain fidelity to federal immigration policy. Such a
position is undesirable vis-à-vis relations with foreign nations.76 Further, since Arizona cannot
actually remove unlawfully present persons, the only possible outcome of rigorous SB 1070
enforcement is movement of immigrants, both lawful and unlawful, into other states.
Effectively, Arizona exports its perceived public policy problems to neighboring states.77 These
types of state policies violate fundamental principles of free movement enshrined in the
Constitution,78 create state regulatory races to the bottom,79 and undermine uniform national
responses to national problems.
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Undoubtedly, even with regard to immigrants and immigration, the Constitution and
federal statutes tolerate some differentiation and policy experimentation. LAWA and state
business-licensing laws are one example. In addition, federal law delegates to states the power
to deny state welfare benefits to certain non-citizens;80 and some states allow undocumented
students to pay in-state tuition at state universities.81 In these instances, states have taken nonuniform positions vis-à-vis immigrants. But these variations are permitted in state policies using
(1) the states’ own resources, in (2) areas of extensive and traditional state regulation, and
pursuant to (3) federal permission for states to engage in the activity. They lend no support to
state immigration enforcement schemes. Unlike the examples cited, state immigration
enforcement laws like SB 1070 strike at the heart of federal immigration prerogatives. They are
attempts to control the entry, exit, and stay of non-citizens, in a manner unauthorized by federal
law, and requiring the expenditure of substantial federal resources. Therefore, the disharmony
created by Arizona’s – and other isolated states’ – unilateral exclusion policy cannot be tolerated
in our federalist system.
In addition to corrupting federal-subfederal interactions, state enforcement schemes also
upset intra-state dynamics by requiring local officers to perform tasks beyond their training, and
inappropriately diverting local resources away from local community policing. SB 1070 §6 asks
local law enforcement officers to arrest individuals if the officer has probable cause to believe
the person to be arrested has committed a removable offense. Determining what constitutes a
“removable offense,” however, is no simple task. There exists no database or convenient list of
removable offenses; rather, whether an offense is a removable offense requires careful
adjudication by those trained in immigration law. And, the INA contains several exceptions,
waivers, and defenses to removal, even if one has committed a removable offense. As Justice
Alito noted in Padilla v. Kentucky, “professional organizations and guidebooks … are right to
say that ‘nothing is ever simple with immigration law’ – including the determination whether
immigration law clearly makes a particular offense removable.”82 Given this complex
immigration background, it is a mystery how local police officers in Arizona will determine
proper arrestees under this provision.
Relatedly, by mandating that local officers perform tasks outside their expertise, state
immigration enforcement schemes undermine local policing efforts themselves.83 Sub-federal
immigration enforcement schemes alienate immigrant communities and cannibalize state and
local resources that should be used for traditional policing efforts. Thus, they perversely
decrease public safety. Notably, these allegations are not the propaganda of immigrant-activist
79
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groups; rather, they are the expert opinion of those with the greatest experience and knowledge
of local policing dynamics. Many state and local officials, including local law enforcement
organizations, have resisted the calls to engage in immigration enforcement because of the toll it
takes on the traditional public safety duty of state and local police.84 The position taken by these
state and local officials – and by jurisdictions enacting sanctuary ordinances – underscores a
lurking reality likely to influence the Court: immigration enforcement simply does not look or
feel like the type of regulatory activity in which sub-federal entities should engage in a federalist
system that divides responsibility for national and local public policy challenges.
III.

The Lesson of Arizona and SB 1070: The Need for Federal Immigration Reform

One thing that the authors and supporters of restrictive state immigration laws, on the one
hand, and immigrant-activists and opponents of such measures, on the other, can agree on: U.S.
immigration policy needs fixing. These opposing camps may vehemently disagree on the
substantive particulars of immigration reform. However, at base, both recognize that the
unlawful migration should be addressed, and that something should be done regarding those
unlawfully present persons already in the country.
Proponents of sub-federal immigration regulation, like SB 1070 and LAWA, use as their
starting point, the fact that United States law has been violated by those who enter or remain
unlawfully present. From this original sin, enforcement advocates argue that any dalliance in
capturing and deporting unlawful migrants breeds disrespect for the rule of law, and
governmental leniency towards this group may encourage more unlawful entry and presence.85
This position is not without any merit.
The real problem is that, from this starting point, enforcement advocates draw the wrong
conclusion. Migration has been, and always will be, a fact of human existence. Human
movement to find work or reunite with family would be unremarkable, but for the legal
construction of political borders between nation-states. But, these man-made demarcations have
never, and will never, stem the tide of migrants in search of work and improved opportunities for
themselves and their families. Further, the United States relies on, and requires, significant
migration to fill its economic needs in both high-skilled and labor sectors.86 Increased border
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vigilance and enforcement, combined with a mismatch between actual labor needs and lawful
entry visas, has only led to increases in the undocumented population, greater number of border
deaths, and increases in human smuggling prices paid to cartels and coyotes.87 These are the
hard and uncontrovertable economic, social, and human facts.
Thus, the crisis of legal legitimacy created by unenforced or ineffective federal
immigration law (cited by advocates as reason for state involvement) cannot be solved by robust
state and local enforcement of those federal laws. The sensible resolution to this perceived crisis
requires enacting immigration laws that account for the geographic, economic, and social
realities and needs of the United States and the population of putative immigrants. Rational
immigration policy that reflects our country’s true needs means increasing the number of lawful
entry visas for both temporary and permanent workers. In addition, it requires eliminating or
restructuring per-country limits on visas that have created insurmountable waitlists and backlogs
from countries of high immigration like Mexico, China, and India. Unsurprisingly, the majority
of the unlawfully present population – whether through illegal entry or visa overstay – hails from
countries with years-long waiting lists for lawful entry.88 Finally, a rational immigration policy
requires practical responses to the existing undocumented population, currently estimated to
number 11 to 12 million persons. On this score, immigration reform must at least include the
DREAM Act to ensure that undocumented college students and military personnel have the
opportunity to remain in and benefit the country.89
While mass deportation might be the emotional, knee-jerk response of restrictionist
forces, it is clearly fantastical. Further calls for mass deportation will only exacerbate the crisis
of legitimacy already plaguing immigration policy. Arizona’s SB 1070 has the potential to
criminalize the estimated 400,000 unlawfully present persons in the state. Actual discovery and
prosecution of this entire population, and their subsequent removal, is practically impossible. In
total, with current resources and capacity, the federal government can only deport a maximum of
400,000 noncitizens per year nationwide.90 Thus, SB 1070 only widens the gap between law and
on-the-ground realities, further increasing the legitimacy crisis in immigration law. In contrast,
the suggested comprehensive immigration reforms better match law, reality, and need, thus
producing greater fidelity to our nation’s immigration law.
The existence of SB 1070, its copycats, and the general increase in sub-federal
immigration regulation, is an indication of the urgent need for this reform. In passing LAWA,
then-Governor, now-Secretary of DHS Janet Napolitano, described Arizona as backed into a
corner by the lack of federal leadership. She noted that despite the fact that LAWA might be a
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“business death penalty,”91 pressing public policy concerns occasioned by unlawful immigration
compelled Arizona to take sub-optimal legislative steps. The empirical validity of this claim
aside, these types of enactments from across the country are a clear message that federal
immigration reform is not just a national priority, it is a national imperative.
Just as undocumented migration is an unchangeable fact in the absence of immigration
reform, so too will be sub-federal immigration laws like LAWA and SB 1070. While the United
States and advocacy groups are likely to prevail in their suits against these emerging laws,
valuable public resources have been squandered both enacting and defending those laws, and
subsequently, protesting and challenging those laws. Even if the Court ultimately strikes down
SB 1070, it is a virtual certainty that the next generation of sub-federal immigration laws,
slightly modified from the original version, will emerge, perhaps from Arizona again. Whiting,
U.S. v. Arizona, Lozano, and their ilk are the beginning of an absurd cycle, not its end. The
message to the citizenry and elected officials – both federal and sub-federal – is that the sooner
we address our immigration concerns through systemic, nation-wide reform, the sooner we can
channel resources to other important national priorities.
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